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Abstract: If actors want to reach a particular goal, they are often better off forming 
collaborative relations and investing together rather than investing separately. We study the 
coordination and cooperation problems that might hinder successful collaboration in a 
dynamic network setting. We develop an experiment in which coordination problems are 
mainly due to finding partners for collaboration, while cooperation problems arise at the 
investment levels of partners who have already agreed to collaborate. The results show that 
as costs of forming links increase, groups succeed less often in solving the coordination 
problem. Still, if subjects are able to solve the coordination problem, they invest in a 
suboptimal way in the network good. It is mostly found that if cooperation is successful in 
terms of investment, it is due to subjects being able to monitor how much their partners 
invest. Moreover, subjects deal better with the coordination and cooperation problems as 
they gain experience.  
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1. Introduction  
If actors want to reach a particular goal, they are often better off forming collaborative relations and 
investing together rather than each trying to reach the goal individually. We study the coordination and 
cooperation problems that endanger successful collaboration in such situations using a computerized 
experiment. More specifically, we study situations in which actors look for relations with others to 
produce what we label a “network good with complementarities.” A network good is a special form of 
a collective good. A classic collective good is characterized by non-excludability: the contribution of 
one benefits the whole group [1,2]. However, for a network good, non-excludability only takes place 
within social relations [3]. In other words, the contribution of a focal actor only benefits the actors who 
are linked to this focal actor through the network including the focal actor himself. A network good 
with complementarities has the characteristic that the investments in this good made by actors become 
more beneficial when these actors are linked to others who also invest [4]. A noteworthy example of 
such a good is knowledge or expertise. An actor’s ideas are often only accessible to those who are in 
contact with this actor. Moreover, combining the expertise of one with the know-how of another can 
lead to a pool of knowledge that is worth more than the sum of its uncombined parts.  
Ballester et al. [4] formulate a game-theoretic model to predict how much actors invest in a network 
good with complementarities when the network structure of collaborations is exogenously given. 
There are two aspects that we explore further. First, Ballester et al. predict that in each network 
structure actors invest according to their Nash equilibrium strategy. If their predictions are correct, this 
would imply a suboptimal production of the network good. In the conditions we use in this study, 
actors typically have to invest more than their Nash equilibrium strategy to reach the optimal level of 
the network good. Although everybody would be better off doing so, this situation is not stable as each 
actor has an incentive to lower his investment and free-ride on others’ investments. Therefore, we 
address the following question in a laboratory experiment: are there circumstances that help subjects to 
overcome the cooperation problem, or are they mostly trapped in the suboptimal Nash equilibrium?  
Second, Ballester et al. [4] assume that the network is fixed, which is perfectly realistic for some 
situations, but in other situations choosing with whom to form collaborative relations is an integral part 
of the interaction structure. For example, companies that want to develop a new product may actively 
approach one or more strategic partners to start an R&D alliance, while nations form pacts to develop 
uniform laws or common policies. To account for this class of situations we present a dynamic version 
of Ballester et al.’s model. This dynamic situation introduces a new problem, namely a coordination 
problem in creating the network of collaborative relations. The coordination problem occurs when we 
let actors start in an empty network. All actors would be better off if they created a particular structure 
of collaborative links and invest enough in the network good. However, because each actor is worse 
off by creating a link as long as other actors have not yet created links, nobody has a direct incentive to 
create the first link. Thus, before turning to the question whether the companies and nations from the 
above examples are able to overcome the cooperation problem, the question we should turn to is: do 
they succeed in starting a collaboration at all?  
We perform a laboratory experiment in which groups of four subjects play a network game for 
several rounds. Specifically, each subject can invest in a network good with complementarities as well 
as propose links to the other three group members. If others accept such a link proposal, a link is 
Games 2010, 1            
 
 
359
formed. The subjects make their decisions in continuous time and see what others are doing. Thus, 
they can adapt their behavior to actions of others instantaneously. After a link is established, the 
investments of both subjects involved become more beneficial, but these subjects also pay link costs. 
As in the examples, establishing and forming collaborative relations is not free and these costs depend 
on the context in which the relations are considered. As long as the costs of forming links are low there 
is hardly any coordination problem, but the higher the link costs the more severe the coordination 
problem becomes. The experimental setting allows us to test whether subjects indeed have more 
difficulty in collaborating as the coordination problem increases by presenting the subjects with three 
different levels of link costs. Furthermore, we investigate whether solving the coordination problem is 
easier for actors who show more strategic sophistication in another type of interaction and whether 
experience helps to solve the coordination problem. 
Even if subjects are able to overcome the coordination problem and form collaborative relations, 
they still face a cooperation problem. One important solution to cooperation problems that has been 
proposed is conditional cooperation [2]. A prerequisite for conditional cooperation is that actors have 
information about whether their partners are cooperating or not. Therefore, we vary whether our 
subjects can see how much others in their group invest in the network good.  
To summarize, our paper includes the following main contributions. First, it provides an 
experimental test for an extended version of the model by Ballester et al. [4] that includes endogenous 
network formation. Second, this experimental test deals with a combination of coordination and 
cooperation problems. Third, we investigate the effects of actors’ strategic sophistication and 
experience for both types of problems. 
In terms of the broader literature, this paper can be placed within a long tradition of research on 
understanding why actors sometimes cooperate peacefully while at other times groups of actors seem 
to approach Hobbes’ “war of all against all.” Within this tradition, many have been concerned with 
cooperation and collective good problems [1,2,5,6] and in particular with the role that social relations 
play (e.g., [7–12]). Our paper is also closely linked to a more recent body of literature that focuses on 
how networks co-evolve with behavior in coordination and cooperation problems (e.g., [13–20]).  
The remainder of the paper is built up as follows: Section 2 introduces first the theoretical model 
and then the game derived from this model that subjects played in the experiment; Section 3 
formulates expectations about the outcomes of the experiment; Section 4 describes further details 
about the data collection and the experiment; Section 5 provides the descriptive results, while Section 
6 discusses the explanatory analyses; Section 7 concludes. 
2. The General Model and the Computerized Game Version 
In this section we first present a general model and then the computerized game version of this 
model subjects played in the experiment. The model is based on Ballester et al. [4], who study 
investments in a network good with complementarities for an exogenously given network. By adding 
opportunities to create and sever links as well as link costs to the model, we analyze situations where 
the network can be expected to co-evolve with the investments made. Galeotti and Goyal [21] took a 
similar approach by developing a “dynamic” version of the “static” model of network goods with 
substitutes by Bramoullé and Kranton [3].  
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2.1. The General Model 
Let N = {1, 2,…, n} be the set of actors and let i and j be typical members of this set. Each actor i 
selects an investment level xi  [0, ] and chooses with whom he would like to form links. Linking 
proposals are denoted by the vector hi = (hi1,…, hin) with hij  {0, 1}. If actor i wants to be linked to j 
then hij = 1, otherwise hij = 0. Actor i cannot link with himself (hii = 0). Actors i and j obtain a link if, 
and only if, gij = hijhji = 1. If i and j do not both propose a link gij = 0. We assume this because the type 
of relations we are interested in, such as collaborations between firms or pacts between nations, need 
the consent of both parties almost by definition. Actor i’s links can be represented by the vector 
gi = (gi1,…, gin). The set of vectors of links for all actors constitutes the symmetric n  n matrix g of 
the network of actors. If we consider a particular network g, let then g–ij (g+ij) be the same network but 
with the link between i and j deleted (added). Define Ni(g) = {j  N | gij = 1} as the set of actors with 
whom i has formed a link. Let then i(g) = |Ni(g)| be the degree of actor i.  
Define si = (xi, hi) as the strategy of actor i including the chosen investment level as well as the link 
proposals. A strategy profile s = (x, h) specifies the investment levels and link proposals of all actors 
and let g bet the resulting network. Then, the payoff of actor i under strategy profile s is given by 
 
with  > 0 and  > 0 meaning that i is strictly concave in own investments. In other words, an actor 
faces decreasing marginal returns to the individual part of his investments. This ensures that the 
optimal individual investment level and payoffs are finite. We set productivity of joint investment 
 > 0, indicating that if i and j have a link, their investments are strategic complements: an increase in 
j’s investment increases the optimal investment level of i. How large this increase is depends on the 
size of . With each link that i makes to another investing actor, his own investments become more 
beneficial. In other words, by adding a link, an actor receives a “complementarity bonus” to his 
investments with the size of  times the investment of the newly created neighbor. We could say that  
offsets the decelerating effect of  to some extent. If  would become too large, it would even prevail 
over  and actors could form a link and invest infinitely to earn infinite payoffs. Ballester et al. [4] 
therefore require that  > (n – 1), which is sufficient to prevent infinite payoffs if actors invest 
according to their Nash equilibrium strategy, i.e., if actors’ investments, given the network, are best 
responses to the investments of others. However, payoffs can still go to infinity if we consider the 
possibility that actors cooperate and invest more than their Nash equilibrium strategy. Therefore, we 
choose the parameters in the experiment such that  > 2(n – 1), which implies that there is a finite 
upper bound on i whatever the network is and whatever actors invest. Finally, the costs of forming 
and maintaining a link are given by c > 0.  
2.2. The Computerized Game Version Used in the Experiment 
We made a computerized game version of this model for four subjects and with  = 48,  = 16, 
 = 2 using the z-Tree software [22]. The game consisted of six different scenarios: a scenario 
combines one of three link cost conditions (c = 10, 30, and 50) with one of two information conditions 
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(information available about others’ investments and payoffs, no such information available) (see 
Table 1). Each subject played each of the six scenarios. The order in which the subjects played the six 
scenarios differed between sessions. Four different orderings were used and each was presented in 
three sessions (see Table 1). Each scenario consisted of five rounds: one unpaid trial round to gain 
experience with the scenario and four rounds that actually mattered for the subjects’ final earnings. In 
the trial rounds, subjects could freely choose investments and links to experience how different choices 
affect the outcomes. In total, subjects played 6  5 = 30 rounds of which 24 rounds were paid. During 
each round, subjects could continuously change their links and investments for a number of seconds 
that was randomly chosen between 90 and 120. This number of seconds was not announced to the 
subjects; they only knew that it was randomly chosen between 90 and 120 seconds. 
Subjects were randomly matched with three other subjects into groups of four at the start of each 
round. Each subject was depicted as a circle on the screen (see Figure 1). Each subject saw him or 
herself as a blue circle, while others in the group appeared as black circles. At the beginning of a new 
round, subjects were randomly shuffled into new groups. Therefore, subjects knew that the persons 
they were playing with in one round were very likely to be different from those they were playing with 
in the previous round. During the entire experiment subjects were not allowed to talk with each other. 
Since points were converted to actual money, subjects are expected to have a real incentive to make 
conscious choices. How many points a subject earned in a round only depended on the situation at the 
end of that round. As follows from the payoff function of the general model, subjects’ earnings 
depended on their own investment level, the number of neighbors they had, how much their neighbors 
invested, and how high link costs were in that particular scenario. When the time of a round was up, a 
message appeared at the bottom of the screen indicating how much a subject earned in this round. The 
network remained visible in the final position so that in the information condition subjects could also 
see how much the other subjects invested at the end of the round and how much other subjects earned. 
Information on the investments and earnings of other subjects was not revealed in the no information 
condition. Subjects did not receive information about accumulated earnings. 
Table 1. The six scenarios and four orderings of scenarios (cells indicate link costs 
followed by whether or not information on others’ investments was available). 
 Scenario Number 
Ordering 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1.  Low-to-high;  
 information first 
costs  = 10; 
info 
costs = 30;  
info 
costs = 50; 
info 
costs = 10; 
no info 
costs = 30;  
no info 
costs = 50; 
no info 
2.  High-to-low;  
 information first 
costs = 50; 
info 
costs = 30;  
info 
costs = 10; 
info 
costs = 50; 
no info 
costs = 30;  
no info 
costs = 10; 
no info 
3.  Low-to-high;  
 no information first 
costs = 10; 
no info 
costs = 30;  
no info 
costs = 50; 
no info 
costs = 10; 
info 
costs = 30;  
info 
costs = 50; 
info 
4.  High-to-low;  
 no information first 
costs = 50; 
no info 
costs = 30;  
no info 
costs = 10; 
no info 
costs = 50; 
info 
costs = 30;  
info 
costs = 10; 
info 
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Figure 1. Screen shot of the computerized game. 
 
Subjects could set their investment level on any non-negative integer number by clicking the 
“invest more” and “invest less” buttons on their screen (see Figure 1). The instructions contained a 
table presenting how many points were earned for all integers from 0 to 14 when a subject did not have 
any links and invested individually. The investments of a subject became worth more when linked to 
another in the group who also invested: in addition to the individual earnings 2  own investment 
level  neighbor’s investment level was received. The link costs were stated at the beginning of a new 
scenario. In each circle, one could the entire round see how much each subject invested and how many 
points this subject would earn in total if the round were to finish. Also, circles increased in size when 
more points were about to be earned. The exceptions were the no information scenarios, in which the 
circles of the other subjects were completely black and the circles did not change in size. In these 
scenarios, a subject only saw this information for own investments and earnings.  
A subject could propose a link to another subject by clicking on the circle of this subject: a 
one-sided arrow would appear to show the link proposal. A link would be established if the other also 
clicked on the circle of the proposing subject: the arrow then changed into a thick double-headed 
arrow. Proposals for links did not cost anything, only fully established links affected earnings. Links 
and proposals for links could be removed at any time by clicking on the circle of the other again. Since 
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earnings only depended on the final situation in a round, subjects were only “charged” for the links 
they were involved in when a round ended. 
Many experiments have a simultaneous-move discrete time design: subjects decide simultaneously 
and then the results of these choices are made known to them, and then they get another opportunity to 
simultaneously choose, and so on. This way, many decisions may change simultaneously, which 
makes coordination on any stable configuration difficult [23]. In a continuous time design, each choice 
of a subject is immediately common knowledge for the group, so subjects always know what they are 
reacting to. The advantage is that subjects do not need to infer what others are going to do as is the 
case when subjects have to move simultaneously. Moreover, since the effect of an action is updated 
immediately also in terms of points to be earned, a subject can promptly revoke an action if it turns out 
to be unsatisfactory. Together with the facilitation of sending signals to group members, subjects thus 
have more possibilities to coordinate individual actions [24]. A final advantage is that this design 
seems more realistic: in the situations we attempt to model, actors can take their decisions in 
continuous time as well and actors can adapt to changes in behavior of others. A disadvantage of this 
design might be that the strategic analysis strictly speaking should incorporate the dynamic nature of 
the game. We pay some attention to this issue below. 
3. Predicting the Outcomes in the Experiment 
In this section, we build on the general result by Ballester et al. [4] for fixed networks to calculate 
the payoffs for all possible networks in our experimental case. We use the term “Nash investments” to 
refer to investments that form a Nash equilibrium if the related network structure is given. We extend 
the notion of pairwise equilibrium [25,26] originally developed for pure network dynamics to predict 
outcomes of the combined link and investment choices in our experiment. Although the strict strategic 
analysis of the continuous time feature of our experiment would require a more sophisticated model, 
we chose to simplify by using a refinement of the Nash equilibrium for the one-shot game. The reason 
is that this provides a very precise prediction, while the dynamic analysis would probably lead to a 
multitude of equilibria and our prediction would still be one of them. Because the continuous time 
feature might actually foster cooperation, we informally address what might be a different prediction 
due to the continuous time feature and test empirically under which conditions the related behavior is 
more likely to emerge.  
3.1. Investments and Payoffs for a Given Network 
Ballester et al. [4] show that given the network each actor’s unique Nash investment is proportional 
to his Bonacich centrality for any , , and  for which  > (n – 1). Bonacich centrality is a network 
centrality measure that counts all possible paths from each actor to all other actors, while path of 
length k have a weight wk. [27]. The weight parameter w can be chosen to fine-tune the centrality 
measure. The Bonacich centrality of an actor thus increases when a link is added by someone with 
whom the actor is connected through a path of any length. The measure reflects the feedback effects 
within the network: how much an actor invests does not only depend on the investments of his 
neighbors, but also on the investments of their neighbors, which in turn depend on the investments of 
their neighbors, and so on. This leads in Ballester et al.’s model to Nash investment levels that are 
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proportional to the Bonacich centrality measure in which paths of length k are weighted by (/)k: the 
larger the ratio / the more interdependent the network is, and the more beneficial it becomes to 
collaborate. For regular networks, i.e., networks where each actor has the same degree , this boils 
down to a Nash investment x* for every actor equal to *regx  = /( − ). The earnings that relate to 
these investments are *reg   = (2)/(2( −)2) − c. 
Ballester et al. [4] predict actors’ investment levels using Nash equilibrium strategies in case the 
network is exogenously given. Although the Nash equilibrium is an obvious solution concept, it 
ignores the possibility of cooperation by actors. Actors may cooperate by investing according to the 
socially optimal investment strategy instead of the Nash equilibrium strategy, which is attractive when 
the social optimum is Pareto efficient. The social optimum for a given structure is reached when actors 
choose investment levels such that the sum of all actors’ payoffs is highest. In regular networks, 
symmetry prescribes that the social optimum is reached for an investment profile in which all actors 
invest the same. In these networks, the socially optimal investment is soregx  = /( − 2), which leads 
to earnings equal to soreg   = 2/(2( − 2)) − c. 
We calculated all payoffs for Nash investments and socially optimal investments for the parameter 
configuration used in our experiment ( = 48,  = 16,  = 2) and all possible networks with four actors 
taking into account that subjects could only choose integer values for their investments. These Nash 
investments and socially optimal investments do not depend on the link costs. We present the results of 
these calculations in Table 2. Because subjects can only choose integer investments, there are multiple 
equilibria for some networks. We chose to display the Pareto-efficient equilibrium in Table 2, which is 
always unique. For some networks, there are also multiple investment combinations that are socially 
optimal. In that case we chose to display the most equal investment profile. Although our choices are 
kind of arbitrary here, note that the Pareto-optimal Nash investments are only relevant for the 
theoretical equilibrium analysis below and the networks related to both choice problems hardly 
occurred in this experiment. 
When we ignore link costs (c = 0), we see in Table 2 that investments and payoffs quickly increase 
when there are more links in the network. These payoffs imply that actors are best off either in the 
empty network or in the complete network depending on the link costs. Table 2 shows also that for low 
link costs any addition of a link becomes beneficial if actors choose Nash investments. In the 
intermediate cost case, actors need to reach almost the complete network, to do better than on their 
own, if they choose Nash investments. If they choose socially optimal investments, a triangle would 
already be better than investing alone. In the high cost condition, the complete network and socially 
optimal investment are both necessary for all actors to do better than investing alone.  
3.2. Combining Link Decisions and Investments 
We use the calculations above to address the link choices that actors want to make. We start with a 
first hypothesis based on Ballester et al. [4] about behavior in a given network. This hypothesis states 
that independent of the network structure or other conditions, Nash investments will be the most 
common amounts invested.  
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Hypothesis 1. Given the network, actors are most likely to invest according to their  
Nash investments. 
Table 2. Pareto-optimal Nash investments (Nash) and socially efficient investments (SO) 
with the related payoffs for given network structures in different cost conditions. 
 = 48,  = 16 
 = 2, n = 4 Investments 
Payoffs 
No cost 
c = 0 
Low cost 
c = 10 
Intermediate cost 
c = 30 
High cost 
c = 50 
Networks  Nash SO Nash SO Nash SO Nash SO Nash SO
Empty   = 0 3 3 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72
2 dyads   = 1 4 4 96 96 86 86 66 66 46 46
2-star 
 
i = 0 3 3 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72
i = 1 4 4 96 104 86 94 66 76 46 54
i = 2 4 5 128 120 108 100 68 60 28 20
Line 
 
 
i = 1 4 4 96 104 86 94 66 74 46 54
i = 2 4 5 128 130 108 120 68 70 28 30
Triangle 
 
i = 0 3 3 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72
i = 2 4 6 128 144 108 124 68 84 28 44
3-star 
 
 
i = 1 4 5 104 112 94 102 74 82 54 62
i = 3 5 7 160 144 130 114 70 54 10 -6
Square   = 2 4 6 128 144 108 124 68 84 28 44
Stem 
 
i = 1 4 5 104 110 94 100 74 80 54 60
i = 2 4 6 144 156 124 136 84 96 44 56
i = 3 5 7 160 182 130 152 70 92 10 32
D-Box 
 
i = 2 4 8 144 160 124 140 84 100 44 60
i = 3 5 9 170 234 140 204 80 144 20 84
Complete   = 3 5 12 190 288 160 258 100 198 40 138
bold = pairwise equilibrium; italics = socially efficient 
To hypothesize which networks can be expected to emerge, we extend the concept of “pairwise 
equilibrium” for our combination of investments and linking decision [25,26].  
Definition. A strategy profile s* = (x*, h*) for the game and payoffs defined above is a pairwise 
equilibrium constituting a pairwise equilibrium network g if and only if  
(i) s* is a Nash equilibrium and 
(ii) Πi( * ijx , g+ij) > Πi(x*, g) implies Πj( * ijx , g+ij) < Πj(x*, g) for all i, j  N where *ijx are the 
Nash investments for the network g+ij.  
This definition limits the equilibria by excluding rather trivial coordination problems in linking 
decisions that are also easily solved in our experimental set-up. Thus, we only consider equilibria in 
which no pair of actors wants to add a link (because at least one actor receives lower payoffs in the 
network with the link than in the network without the link). All pairwise equilibrium configurations 
are indicated with bold figures in Table 2. These are the complete network for the low cost condition 
and the empty network for the high cost condition. For the intermediate cost condition, both the empty 
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and the complete network are pairwise equilibria. All other configurations do not constitute equilibria 
as can be inferred from Table 2. Note that c = 0 is not one of the experimental conditions, but only 
provided as a reference. The results in Table 2 lead to the following three hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2. In the low cost condition (c = 10), actors are more likely to coordinate on the 
complete network than on any other network. 
Hypothesis 3. In the intermediate cost condition (c = 30), actors are more likely to coordinate on 
the empty network or on the complete network than on any other network.  
Hypothesis 4. In the high cost condition (c = 50), actors are more likely to coordinate on the empty 
network than on any other network. 
The most difficult case to address is the intermediate cost condition. Because the subjects in the 
experiment start in the empty network, it is not to be taken for granted that they reach the complete 
network with Nash investments, because there are many situations in between in which they are worse 
off than in the empty network. As mentioned in the description of the computerized game, while 
“virtual” earnings are updated instantly on the screen, the actual payoffs are not calculated in 
continuous time but only at the end of the round. This means that subjects can display a great deal of 
costless trial-and-error in changing investments and links. Therefore, in our design, subjects are strictly 
speaking not worse off in intermediate networks as only the end result counts. However, since subjects 
do not know when a round would end, there is the threat of ending up in an intermediate network 
configuration in which a subject are worse off than in the empty network. We surmise that this threat 
of being worse off was enough to create a real coordination problem. Indeed, observing the behavior in 
our experiment shows that subjects are rather sensitive to the changes in their earnings (even though 
they are virtual) and that it was not necessarily easy to coordinate actions. If subjects plan ahead 
enough steps they might realize the benefits of creating the full network, but if they only do one or a 
few steps of thinking, they remain stuck in the empty network. However, even if subjects realize that 
the full network is advantageous, they still have to form beliefs about whether the other subjects do so 
as well. A subject who is fully aware of the benefits of the full network might not try and create the 
full network if he believes that the other subjects are not aware of the benefits of the full network. In 
other words, subjects with limited strategic sophistication will frustrate the coordination of the full 
network. We thus expect that if a group consists of strategically more sophisticated actors, this group 
is more likely to solve the coordination problem in the intermediate cost condition. In addition, actors 
can gain strategic sophistication over time through several learning mechanisms [28], which would 
make solving the coordination problem more likely [29]. In our experiment, subjects play the 
intermediate cost condition for multiple rounds. Subjects are likely to gain strategic sophistication as 
they play more rounds, which should also facilitate reaching the complete network. Moreover, half of 
the subjects play the intermediate cost condition after they played the low cost condition (low-to-high 
ordering) and the other half after they played the high cost condition (high-to-low ordering). Subjects 
are more likely to gain insight into the benefits of collaborating in the complete network in the low 
cost condition than in the high cost condition, because the complete network will emerge more often in 
the low cost condition. This insight might be subsequently used in the intermediate cost condition. 
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Finally, actors with lower strategic sophistication themselves can learn from, and imitate those, who 
understand the situation better [29]. We compare our experimental condition in which subjects can 
observe the investments of others with the condition in which subjects cannot see these investments. 
When actors can see how much others invest, it is easier to learn from each other than when actors do 
not have this information. Moreover, actors can attract others to link to them by increasing their 
investments. Thus, coordination is more likely if subjects can observe others’ investments. The 
arguments above lead to the following extensions of Hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 3a. In the intermediate cost condition, the complete network will be reached more often 
relative to the empty network, when the group consists of strategically more sophisticated actors. 
Hypothesis 3b. In the intermediate cost condition, the complete network will be reached more often 
relative to the empty network, the more rounds are played.  
Hypothesis 3c. In the intermediate cost condition, the complete network will be reached more often 
relative to the empty network, in the low-to-high ordering, as compared to the high-to-low ordering.  
Hypothesis 3d. In the intermediate cost condition, the complete network will be reached more often 
relative to the empty network, when actors have information about the investments of others than when 
they do not have this information. 
Linked actors face a public good type of problem, where their Nash investments can be seen as 
“defecting” and investing more can be interpreted as contributing to the “network good.” The maximal 
investment that makes sense is where the social optimum is reached. In a one-shot situation, defecting 
is the dominant strategy. However, subjects in the experiment play a game in which they have some 
time to indicate their intentions for a specific investment and observe the intentions of others. Because 
the experimental round ends at an unknown point in time, this resembles a repeated game setting with 
an unknown end. Subjects can show their intentions to cooperate by investing more than the Nash 
investments and if they observe that others reciprocate and invest more as well, they can continue to 
increase until they reach the social optimum. If partners start to decrease their investments, the focal 
actor can reduce own investments again or can even sever the link with an uncooperative other. 
Therefore, our experimental setting clearly provides opportunities for conditional cooperation even 
though the intentions are not actually paid. We conjecture that if one would analyze the continuous 
time game as a dynamic game, the socially optimal investments can also be part of an equilibrium 
strategy. One probably needs the assumption that actors can instantaneously react on decisions of 
others, which is however doubtful in the experimental setting. The mechanism described above is only 
likely to work if subjects can observe the investments of the others. Therefore, we expect that 
cooperative investments above the Nash investments are more likely if subjects are in the experimental 
condition in which they have information about investments of other subjects. Note that we still 
consider Nash investments as the baseline prediction (see Hypothesis 1), but because the experiment 
provides opportunities for further cooperation as well, we investigate these potential deviations of the 
Nash investments in more detail.  
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Still, for similar reasons as formulated for the coordination part of the game, we expect that not all 
subjects are equally able to establish cooperation based on conditional cooperation. It is not automatic 
for subjects to realize that jointly investing more than the Nash investments can lead to better 
outcomes for all. Therefore, subjects really had to anticipate themselves what the consequences of 
their own actions would be in combination with those of the others. It takes quite some thinking to 
answer questions such as: “In the complete network with everybody choosing Nash investments, might 
it be beneficial for two, three, or four actors, if each of them increases their investment by one point?” 
Since being aware of such potential is a prerequisite for establishing cooperation, we expect that 
strategically sophisticated actors are more likely to cooperate. In addition, if actors gain experience 
they might learn to establish higher payoffs by cooperating because they understand the interaction 
situation better. This leads to the two last hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 5. The level of cooperation will be higher when subjects have information about the 
investments of others than when they do not have this information. 
Hypothesis 6. The level of cooperation will be higher when the group consists of strategically more 
sophisticated actors. 
Hypothesis 7. The level of cooperation will be higher the more rounds are played. 
4. Experimental Design 
4.1. Data Collection 
In total 12 experimental sessions were conducted in December 2008 at the ELSE laboratory of 
Utrecht University. A total of 1420 subjects from a self-selected database were invited to participate in 
a study called “Investing in networks” using the Online Recruitment System for Economic 
Experiments (ORSEE) [30]. Subjects were told that earnings would be around €16, but that exact 
earnings depended on their own and others’ decisions. A total of 212 subjects participated in the 
experiment. During one session there was a network break down. The 12 subjects participating in this 
session were not able to finish playing all rounds and could not fill in the questionnaire at the end. 
Nevertheless, the rounds that they did play will be used in the analyses if possible. The other sessions 
consisted either of 16 subjects (in five sessions) or 20 subjects (in six sessions). The majority of 
subjects were students at Utrecht University from a wide range of disciplines and nationalities, 
although non-students also participated. The age of the 200 subjects who completed the experiment 
was between 17 and 39 years old (with a mean age of 21.7), of which 68% were female and 77%  
were Dutch. 
4.2. Procedure 
Upon entering the laboratory subjects were randomly assigned to a cubicle. After a short oral 
introduction (mentioning practicalities) the subjects received printed instructions in the language of 
their choice (English or Dutch). These instructions explained that subjects could ask questions at any 
time and that 150 points in the experiment equaled a €1 payment. The instructions explained how the 
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game and how the choices of subjects in the game influenced their earnings (the English version of the 
instructions is available in the electronic supplementary information). After reading the instructions, 
subjects chose on their computer screen to continue in English or in Dutch, which triggered the start of 
the actual game. Although this hardly occurred, subjects could direct questions to the experiment 
leader if they did not understand something at any time. 
After playing the network games, there was an additional task—a “Beauty Contest” [31]—in which 
subjects were asked to enter a number between 0 and 100. The subjects were explained that the person 
entering the number closest to half of the average of all numbers entered would win this contest and 
receive an additional € 5. The Beauty Contest is a game typically used to measure subjects’ strategic 
sophistication [32]. Finally, subjects were asked to complete a standard questionnaire covering 
background information after which they received their monetary earnings. This whole procedure 
lasted around 1.75 hours and earnings resulting from playing all rounds of the game ranged from  
€ 11.50 to € 20, with mean earnings being € 17.19 (this excludes the additional earnings of the Beauty 
Contest winner). The 12 subjects that did not complete the experiment were paid the expected average 
of € 16 each. 
5. Descriptive Results 
Table 3 shows the number of times that a group of subjects established a particular network at the 
moment that a round was finished in the different conditions of the experiment. We see that groups 
mostly created either the empty or the complete network, and not so much of the other possible 
structures in between. We may conclude that subjects are most likely to coordinate on the complete 
network in the low cost condition (Hypothesis 2), on the empty or the complete network in the 
intermediate cost condition (Hypothesis 3), and on the empty network in the high cost condition 
(Hypothesis 4). Although these patterns are so clear-cut that there is little added value in additional 
significance tests, we confirm them below in a statistical analysis.  
Table 3. Observed networks in total and per condition for all 24 paid rounds. 
  c = 10  c = 30  c = 50  All link costs 
Network  Info No info Total  Info No info Total  Info No info Total  Info No info Total
Empty  0 0 0  46 49 95  195 192 387  241 241 482
Dyad  0 0 0  9 12 21  10 13 23  19 25 44
2 dyads  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 1 1
2-star  0 0 0  4 5 9  1 1 2  5 6 11
Line  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 1 1  0 2 2
Triangle  1 0 1  5 7 12  1 3 4  7 10 17
3-star  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 0 1
Square  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0
Stem  4 3 7  8 4 12  0 0 0  12 7 19
D-Box  8 5 13  21 16 37  0 0 0  29 21 50
Complete  199 192 391  118 115 233  5 1 6  322 308 630
Total  212 200 412  212 209 421  212 212 424  636 621 1,257
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Table 4 contains information about the observed investment profiles of the groups given the 
network they created. Since other networks than the empty and the complete network are observed so 
rarely, we decided to collapse them into one category “Other.” We distinguish between groups where 
subjects implement Nash investments (Nash), groups where subjects cooperate (Coop), and a rest 
category for all other investment profiles (Rest).  
It is rather stringent to require that all four subjects in a group invest exactly according to the Nash 
investments in order to classify the group as Nash. It is not unreasonable to allow for the possibility 
that subjects intend to invest according to the Nash investments but make a small mistake (for 
example, because they are caught out by the time limit). With this in mind we also qualify a group as 
Nash if at most one subject in the group deviates at most one point from the Nash investment level.  
We define cooperation to take place when at least two subjects who are linked invest more than the 
Nash investments and both benefit from investing more. We believe it is central to cooperation that 
both subjects become better off because they invest more than the Nash investments. Therefore, we 
exclude those cases where two linked subjects invest more than the Nash investments, but they are not 
both better off (e.g., because at least one of them invests too much or they are linked to a third actor 
who exploits them). Also, we exclude cases where the increase in payoffs of both subjects is not due to 
their own increase in investment, but because they are linked to a third actor with an extremely high 
investment level. Such a third actor “sponsors” the pair of subjects by sacrificing own payoffs. To 
exclude such cases, we require that the sum of the payoffs of the two cooperating subjects and all their 
neighbors must be at least as high as would be the case if all those subjects chose Nash investments.  
Table 4. Observed investment profiles in total and per condition for all 24 paid rounds. 
  c = 10  c = 30  c = 50  All link costs 
Network Invest. Info No Info Total  Info No Info Total Info No info Total  Info No Info Total
Empty Nash 0 0 0  43 46 89 191 185 376  234 231 465
 Coop  - - -  - - - - - -  - - -
 Rest  0 0 0  3 3 6 4 7 11  7 10 17
 Total 0 0 0  46 49 95 195 192 387  241 241 482
Other Nash 3 2 5  26 33 59 5 8 13  34 43 77
 Coop  2 0 2  12 1 13 1 0 1  15 1 16
 Rest  8 6 14  10 11 21 6 11 17  24 28 52
 Total 13 8 21  48 45 93 12 19 31  73 72 145
Complete Nash 136 149 285  81 89 170 0 0 0  217 238 455
 Coop 33 8 41  22 11 33 5 0 5  60 19 79
 Rest  30 35 65  15 15 30 0 1 1  45 51 96
 Total 199 192 391  118 115 233 5 1 6  322 308 630
Total Nash 139 151 290  150 168 318 196 193 389  485 512 997
 Coop 35 8 43  34 12 46 6 0 6  75 20 95
 Rest  38 41 79  28 29 57 10 19 29  76 89 165
 Total 212 200 412  212 209 421 212 212 424  636 621 1,257
Table 4 shows that, in line with Hypothesis 1, groups invested extremely often Nash: in 997 or 79% 
of the 1,257 cases; especially in the empty network many groups invested Nash (465 of 482, 96%), 
followed by the complete network (455 of 630, 72%), and the other networks (77 of 145, 53%). Later 
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we test whether these differences are a reason to reject the expectation that it should not matter which 
network is created for Nash investments to be chosen. Using the stricter definition for the Nash 
investments in which all four subjects should choose exactly the Nash investments, still 786 of the 997 
networks would have been classified as Nash. We performed our analyses also using this strict 
definition. This does not lead to qualitatively different conclusions. 
Cooperation takes place only on a moderate scale: only 95 times out of 1,257 cases (8%). We see 
these cases as attempts to reach the socially optimal investment levels. The exact socially efficient 
network configuration (the complete network where everybody invests 12 as indicated in Table 1) was 
realized by just one group. Cooperation occurs by far most in the complete network where the possible 
gains of cooperation are also largest (79 times versus 16 in other networks). Conditional on the 
network that was created, cooperation succeeds almost equally often in the complete network (13%) 
and in the other networks (11%). Cooperation is not possible by design in the empty network and some 
other networks as explained above. Groups created a network in which cooperation is possible 718 
times. The 95 successful cases imply that groups were able to materialize this potential 13% of the 
time. In line with Hypothesis 5, cooperation was realized more often in the information condition  
(75 times) than in the no information condition (20 times). Below we analyze in more detail which 
factors promoted cooperation.  
6. Analyses 
6.1. Analysis Strategy 
We test our hypotheses using a conditional logit model. This model is appropriate when dealing 
with a dependent variable with nominal outcome categories and resembles McFadden’s discrete choice 
model [33,34]. In our case, the outcomes that a group of subjects can realize at the end of a round are, 
for example, “the empty network where everybody invests Nash,” or “the complete network where 
cooperation takes place”. The coefficients in the analysis should be interpreted almost the same as 
coefficients in a logistic regression analysis with the only difference that they need to be evaluated 
relative to the reference category. If we, for example, find a positive effect of the variable Nash, this 
implies that the Nash investments are more likely to result at the end of the round than the outcome 
used as the reference category, which in this case might be any other investment profile. The network 
structure is another example of a characteristic of the outcomes. The coefficient of an interaction such 
as Nash  Complete represents how the likelihood that a Nash investment profile is established differs 
between the complete network and the network belonging to the reference category. Note that the 
outcome characteristics become independent variables in the respective analyses in the sense that, e.g., 
whether an outcome contains Nash investments as a characteristic might make this outcome more 
likely to occur. Group characteristics, such as the link cost condition, how many rounds the subjects in 
a group have played, or how strategically sophisticated the group is, are also independent variables, 
but their main effects are not identified. The reason is that for a particular group in a given condition 
these variables do not vary and, thus cannot determine which outcome this group, in this condition, 
reaches. However, we can test interaction effects of outcome characteristics with conditions and group 
characteristics to determine whether specific outcomes are more or less likely in specific conditions or 
for specific groups. As an example, the interaction Nash  Round indicates how the likelihood that a 
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group establishes a Nash investment profile changes with the number of the Round this group is in. A 
positive effect indicates that Nash investment profiles are more likely in later rounds. If these 
interactions are included, the reference category becomes also more specific. The main effect of Nash 
if the interaction with Round is included represents the likelihood of a Nash investment profile in a 
round zero relative to the likelihood of another investment profile in round zero. 
Letting all subjects play in all conditions has important advantages. First, it provides the possibility 
to study effects of experience on actors’ behavior. Second, it makes within-subject comparisons of 
behavior in different conditions possible. Third, it reduces the number of subjects needed for 
comparing different conditions rather than a purely between-subjects design. This last point is 
especially important for studying groups and networks of subjects because a between-subjects design 
would really require an infeasible amount of subjects. One disadvantage of our design is that we need 
to use more sophisticated statistical techniques, but the current availability of these techniques in 
standard statistical packages reduces this problem. 
The standard conditional logit model assumes that observations for each group are independent, 
which is not the case in our data. Groups are not independent because the same subjects are involved 
in multiple groups. Because each group has four members, this creates a complicated non-hierarchical 
nesting structure of group-level observations. Within the conditional logit model, it is possible to 
control for this non-hierarchical structure by using robust standard errors adapted for multi-way  
clustering [35].  
In principle, our outcome set could consist of all strategy profiles (i.e., all possible networks 
multiplied by all possible investment profiles). However, we collapse many of these different 
outcomes into one category as we did in the description of the experimental results. First, we test 
Hypotheses 1 through 4 using a set of six outcomes: (empty network with Nash investment profile; 
empty network with another investment profile; complete network with Nash investment profile; 
complete network with another investment profile; another network with Nash investment profile; 
another network with another investment profile). Second, we test Hypotheses 5 through 7 using three 
outcome categories: (Nash investment profile, cooperative investment profile, another investment 
profile). The first set is tailored to test hypotheses mostly concerned with the network structure of the 
outcomes, and the second set to test hypotheses focusing on investments, in particular cooperation.  
As a measure of strategic sophistication of subjects, we looked at how well subjects performed in 
the Beauty Contest [31,32]. The subjects were ranked according to how close they got to the winning 
number, with the winner ranked 1, the second closest ranked 2, and so forth, which implies that 
strategic sophistication includes how well a subject is able to anticipate decisions of others. This score 
was divided by the total number of contestants. This gives a score of between 0 and 1. We subtracted 
this score from 1 to ensure that higher scores mean more strategic sophistication. The average score of 
the four group members was taken to measure the strategic sophistication of a group as a whole, which 
is represented by the variable “Sophistication” in the tables below. The value of this variable ranged 
from .088 to .828 with a mean of .473. To construct interactions with Sophistication we centered the 
variable at its mean, such that the reference category if interactions with Sophistication are included 
represents groups with a mean level of Sophistication. We coded “the number of rounds played” to 
start at 0 rather than 1, so that the first round formed the reference category. In the analyses in Table 6 
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below we count the number of paid rounds played so far in the intermediate cost condition, while in 
Table 7 we use the number of paid rounds played so far in the whole experiment. 
6.2. Results 
As predicted in Hypothesis 1, groups are more likely to choose Nash investments than all other 
possible investment levels as the positive and significant coefficient for Nash investments in Model 0 
of Table 5 shows. In Model 1, the coefficient for Nash indicates whether Nash in the empty network is 
a more likely outcome than other investments in the empty network. The positive and significant effect 
indicates that indeed Nash investments are more likely for the empty network than other investments. 
The interaction effect Nash  Complete indicates the extent to which the likelihood that the Nash 
investment profile occurs differs between the empty and the complete network. We anticipated that the 
type of network created would not be related to whether a group invests Nash or something else. 
However, as the coefficient of Nash  Complete in Model 1 in Table 5 shows, the likelihood of a Nash 
investment profile is significantly lower in the complete network than in the empty network. Also in 
other networks, Nash investments are less likely than in the empty network. In turn, the  
Nash investments are less likely in other networks than in the complete network as follows from an 
additional test for the difference between these two coefficients  
(b = –3.185 – (–2.353) = –.831, S.E. = .189, p < .001, Wald test). In the empty network, subjects can 
optimize their investment level independent of what the others do. Therefore, it is understandable that 
subjects succeed more often in setting their optimal investment level in the empty network than in all 
other networks, where subjects have to coordinate their actions with those of the others. Moreover, in 
the complete network, and many of the other networks, there exists the possibility to cooperate: 
subjects may thus intentionally try to coordinate their actions away from the Nash investments. 
In Model 2, we test whether the occurrence of a specific network and Nash investments differs per 
cost condition. These interactions of the different network outcomes with the cost condition uphold our 
earlier confirmation of Hypotheses 2 through 4, based on the descriptive results that the higher the link 
costs the less often a group creates the complete network compared to the empty network. The positive 
coefficient Complete  costs = 10 indicates that the complete network occurs more often in the low cost 
condition than in the intermediate cost condition, while the negative coefficient of Complete  costs = 50 
shows that the complete network is less likely in the high cost condition than in the intermediate cost 
condition. We also see that there are no compelling reasons to believe that Nash investments occur 
more often in the low cost condition (Nash  costs = 10 is not significant) or the high cost condition 
(Nash  costs = 50 is not significant) than in the intermediate cost condition.  
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Table 5. Conditional logit model for the likelihood of Nash investments and different 
networks with robust standard errors corrected for multiple group memberships. 
  Model 0a Model 1b  Model 2c 
  Coeff. S.E.  p Coeff. S.E.  p  Coeff. S.E.  p 
Nash investment 1.344 .117 .000 3.309 .311 .000  3.785 .516 .000
Complete network  2.332 .338 .000  3.357 .666 .000
Other network  1.386 .298 .000  2.951 .564 .000
Nash  Complete  –2.353 .343 .000  –2.738 .545 .000
Nash  Other  –3.185 .375 .000  –3.519 .533 .000
     
Complete  costs = 10    18.525 .693 .000
Other  costs = 10    16.495 .738 .000
Complete  costs = 50    –5.228 .592 .000
Other  costs = 50    –2.772 .400 .000
Nash  costs = 10    –.137 .141 .332
Nash  costs = 50    –.567 .496 .253
Number of groups   1,257    1,257  
Log Likelihood   –1,756    –1,189  
a Reference category is non-Nash investments 
b Reference category is non-Nash investments in the empty network 
c Reference category is non-Nash investments in the empty network for intermediate link costs = 30 
Table 6 presents the models used to test the explanations as to why some groups solve the 
coordination problem in the intermediate cost condition (i.e., create the complete network) and others 
do not (i.e., create the empty network). Table 6 shows that the complete network is significantly more 
often created than the empty network in the intermediate cost condition (Complete in Model 3). If we 
add the strategic sophistication of groups, the number of rounds played in the intermediate cost 
condition, the ordering of cost conditions, and whether information about others’ investments and 
payoffs was available, we see that we can refine this conclusion. In line with Hypothesis 3a, the more 
strategically sophisticated groups are, the better able they are to reach the complete network 
(Complete  Sophistication in Model 4); although this effect is only significant at the 10% level for a 
two-sided test. Groups create the complete network more often when they have played more rounds 
(Complete  Round). This supports the idea that as subjects gain experience with the coordination 
problem, they are better able to solve it (Hypothesis 3b). However, groups are not significantly more 
likely to create the complete network if they start in the low cost condition as opposed to the high cost 
condition (Complete  Low/High). This finding contradicts our expectation that if subjects start in the 
low cost condition, they have easier opportunities to learn that they can profit from coordinating on the 
complete network (Hypothesis 3c). Finally, we do not find evidence for Hypothesis 3d that having 
information about others’ investments increases the ability of groups to solve the coordination problem 
(Complete  Info). 
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Table 6. Conditional logit model for the likelihood of reaching a network structure in the 
intermediate cost condition (c = 30) with robust standard errors corrected for multiple 
group memberships. 
  Model 3a  Model 4b 
  Coeff. S.E.  p  Coeff. S.E.  p 
Complete network .879 .285 .002 –.464 .627 .459
Other network –.114 .243 .639 –.544 .388 .162
   
Complete  Sophistication (0–1) 2.236 1.298 .085
Other  Sophistication (0–1) 2.191 1.480 .139
Complete  Round (0–7) .301 .098 .002
Other  Round (0–7) .057 .082 .483
Complete  Low/High .678 .634 .284
Other  Low/High .510 .503 .311
Complete  Information .051 .395 .897
Other  Information .109 .224 .625
Number of groups  400  400  
Log Likelihood  –673 –649  
a Reference category is the empty network 
b Reference category is the empty network for groups with Sophistication at its mean value in the first round, 
who start with the high cost condition and are in the no information condition. 
In Table 7, the results are presented to test the hypotheses related to the emergence of cooperation 
(Hypotheses 5 through 7). Table 7 shows that cooperative investments are less often observed than 
Nash investments in all cost conditions (see Model 5). For the low cost condition and the intermediate 
cost condition, the level of cooperation is comparable (Cooperation  costs = 10), but it is much lower 
in the high cost condition (Cooperation  costs = 50), which we also saw in the descriptives in Table 4. 
Additionally, we see that all other investment profiles also occur less often than the Nash investments 
(Rest, Rest  costs = 10, Rest  costs = 50).  
We find support for Hypothesis 5 that cooperation is more easily achieved when subjects have 
information about what the others in their group invest than when subjects cannot directly monitor 
others’ investing behavior (Cooperation  Information in Model 6). Although the effect of strategic 
sophistication is in the expected direction, we do not find that strategic sophistication helps to reach 
cooperation (the coefficient of Cooperation  Sophistication is not significant). As subjects play more 
rounds, they more often succeed to cooperate, as predicted by Hypothesis 7 (Cooperation  Round).  
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Table 7. Conditional logit model for the likelihood of an investment profile with robust 
standard errors corrected for multiple group memberships. 
  Model 5a  Model 6b 
  Coeff. S.E.  p  Coeff. S.E.  p 
Cooperation –1.904 .222 .000 –3.620 .586 .000
Rest –1.740 .170 .000 –1.321 .223 .000
Cooperation  costs = 10 .027 .196 .892 –.003 .221 .990
Rest  costs = 10 .433 .192 .024 .421 .184 .022
Cooperation  costs = 50 –2.221 .641 .001 –2.309 .621 .000
Rest  costs = 50 –1.041 .366 .004 –1.038 .363 .004
   
Cooperation  Information 1.389 .299 .000
Rest  Information –.086 .205 .675
Cooperation  Sophistication (0–1) 1.853 1.316 .159
Rest  Sophistication (0–1) .147 .887 .868
Cooperation  Round (0–23) .064 .029 .028
Rest  Round (0–23) –.035 .020 .072
Number of groups  1,200  1,200  
Log Likelihood  –730  –697  
a Reference category is Nash investment profile at link costs = 30 
b Reference category is Nash investment profile at link costs = 30 for groups with Sophistication at its mean 
value in the first round and in the no information condition 
7. Conclusion and Discussion 
The puzzle as to why and how people form and sever relations, why they sometimes reach a 
successful collaboration and why they sometimes fail, has occupied many thinkers since Hobbes [7]. In 
this paper, we looked at a small piece of this puzzle by studying the coordination and cooperation 
problems that hinder actors in successfully creating collaborative relations to jointly produce—what we 
have labeled—a network good with complementarities. As opposed to everybody investing 
individually, all actors benefit by forming links and adjusting investment levels upwards because a 
network good with complementarities has the characteristic that investments become more beneficial 
when an investor is linked to others who also invest. However, coordination problems may restrain a 
group of actors from successfully creating the structure of collaborative relations, while cooperation 
problems may lead to underinvestment, both resulting in a suboptimal production of the good. We 
extended a model by Ballester et al. [4] with the option to create and sever links in order to analyze 
which networks and investment levels groups of actors are likely to choose depending on the level of 
the link costs and the information availability about others’ investments. We tested the predictions 
using a computerized laboratory experiment.  
Regarding the emerging networks, we found—in support of our expectations based on a pairwise 
equilibrium concept—that subjects either created the empty or the complete network (and rarely any 
structure in between). Also as expected, the higher the link costs the more often the empty network and 
the less often the complete network was created. Since there are hardly any coordination problems to 
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be solved if link costs are low, groups almost always created the complete network. In the intermediate 
cost condition, groups sometimes solved the coordination problems and reached the complete network, 
and sometimes they did not which resulted in the empty network. Because in the high cost condition, 
the complete network only becomes more profitable than the empty network when the cooperation 
problems are solved in conjunction with the coordination problems, this proved to be too difficult for 
almost all groups. This therefore resulted mostly in empty networks with all subjects investing 
individually in the high cost condition.  
In order to solve the coordination problem, actors need to look ahead far enough and correctly 
anticipate the actions of the others in their group. Indeed, we found that groups solved the coordination 
problem more frequently the more rounds they played. Experience apparently helps to discover how to 
reach a better equilibrium. However, we only found weak support that strategically more sophisticated 
groups of subjects solved the coordination problem more often and we did not find that strategic 
sophistication fostered cooperation. Maybe measuring sophistication by letting subjects play the 
Beauty Contest game only once does not provide an accurate measurement. Subjects might 
accidentally choose the right number so the measurement provides no evidence that subjects change 
their behavior when they receive information about the behavior of others. One should let subjects 
play the game more often to obtain information on such adaptive thinking. Coordination does not seem 
to be facilitated if subjects can see how much others invest. This finding can be explained by realizing 
that subjects can immediately observe when they create a link whether their own earnings increase, 
even if they do not know how much the other subjects invest. Apparently, not having the information 
on others’ investments does not deter creating links. 
Regarding investments, we found, in accordance with predictions of Ballester et al. [4], that groups 
of subjects mostly—almost 80% of the time—chose Nash investments given the network they created. 
This implies that a subject’s Bonacich centrality is a good predictor for how much this subject invests 
in our experiment. It also implies suboptimal production of the network good. If all subjects would 
collaborate and invest more than the Nash investments, everybody could be better off especially in the 
complete network. In our experiment, subjects had great trouble in solving this cooperation problem. 
However, not solving the cooperation problem is less severe under some conditions. If subjects had 
information about how much the others in their group invested, cooperation was more often successful. 
This is understandable because observing others’ investments facilitates conditional cooperation. 
There may also be another mechanism at work: some actors may simply not realize that they are 
underinvesting because they do not recognize the possibility to earn more collectively. These actors 
can learn from, and imitate, those who are aware of the possibilities of cooperation, but of course only 
if information about others’ investments is available to them. This last view was supported by our 
findings that cooperation was more often successful when subjects in a group had played the game for 
more rounds.  
We additionally found that the level of cooperation was much higher in the low and intermediate 
cost condition than in the high cost condition. We can explain this as follows: For successful 
cooperation, subjects do not only have to increase investments together, they also have to create a 
structure in which cooperation is possible. The potential benefits of cooperation are highest in the 
complete network. In the low and intermediate cost condition, the complete network is already more 
profitable than the empty network when everybody chooses Nash investments. Therefore, it is safe for 
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subjects to first create the complete network and then apply Nash investments. From there on they can 
try to increase investments together. In the high cost condition, the complete network cannot perform 
this role of being a “stepping stone,” because subjects are better off investing alone if everybody 
chooses Nash investments. Therefore, in the high cost condition, some subjects already break off the 
links before cooperation can start to develop. Of course cooperation could also have been facilitated by 
subjects with non-selfish preferences. Because cooperative behavior was not so common in the 
experiment, and including non-standard utility assumptions in the theory would have made the theory 
much more complex, we refrained from further elaborating that line of reasoning.  
What do the findings mean, for example, for companies that want to start R&D collaborations? The 
good news is that, as long as the costs of starting R&D relations are not too high, it seems that the 
companies sooner or later are likely to realize their common interest and create an R&D platform. The 
bad news is that it may be very difficult to reach the full potential of an established collaboration 
because of free-rider problems. If the companies truly want an innovative product, they would be wise 
to design their collaboration in such a way that it is transparent how many resources each devotes to 
the joint venture. 
Of course, one should be careful to draw too extensive implications from the findings of this small 
and abstract laboratory study. First, companies would be able to communicate with each other about 
the details of collaboration, while the subjects in our experiment could not. Since it seems that the 
failure to solve the coordination and cooperation problems is partly due to lack of insight by some of 
the subjects, communication between subjects could spread insight quicker through the population. It 
would be interesting to see whether the possibility to send each other text messages could increase the 
level of network good production in the experiment. Second, the benefits of collaboration increase 
rapidly with each new collaborative partner in our model. Therefore, the complete network is 
extremely beneficial and often the predicted and observed outcome. However, this does not mean that 
we expect that all companies in any particular industry are better off if they all work together. On the 
contrary, we expect that decreasing marginal returns related to the number of collaborative partners 
puts a limit on the optimal number of partners; this is an especially relevant factor to be taken into 
account when networks become larger. Future research on real-world networks might shed more light 
on whether the mechanisms that we discovered in this paper work in larger networks or networks with 
more communication possibilities as well. 
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